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Solution Architecture: Centralized Authorization Service (BFF-resident, PDP-agnostic)

Status: Second-opinion response to problem-statement.md Date: 2026-06-05 Scope: Architecture + security model + standalone migration. Companion to the problem statement; not yet a /speckit spec.

0. TL;DR — the decision

The problem statement frames five competing options. They are not competing — they are layers of one design. Collapse them:

One decision core. Two transports. One optional claim. Shadow-first migration.

                        ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────┐
                        │     Authorization Decision Core (lib/authz)    │
                        │  PDP-agnostic types · reason codes · domain    │
                        │  composition · ONE OpenFGA adapter behind it   │
                        └───────────────┬───────────────┬───────────────┘
            in-process call             │               │        HTTP (out-of-process PEPs)
        ┌───────────────────────────────┘               └────────────────────────────────┐
        ▼                                                                                  ▼
  BFF route handlers                                              POST /api/authz/v1/decisions
  (authorize / authorizeMany / authorizeOrThrow)                  POST /api/authz/v1/decisions:batch
  no network hop                                                  POST /api/authz/v1/explain  (admin)
                                                                  (optional) signed decision tokens
                                                                          ▲
                                       ┌──────────────────────────────────┼───────────────────────┐
                                       │                                   │                        │
                                  Dynamic Agents                       RAG server                Slack/Webex bots
                                  (thin PEP, no Mongo,                 (thin PEP, no Mongo,       (thin PEP)
                                   no OpenFGA client)                   no OpenFGA client)

Everything the four bullets ask for falls out of this shape:

Your ask	How this delivers it
No MongoDB in Dynamic Agents	DA calls the HTTP API for decisions; the service owns workflow-visibility data and audit writes. DA keeps zero policy Mongo.
Reusable authz modules	The core is the one reusable module. BFF imports it in-process; DA/RAG/bots consume it over HTTP. No second/third reimplementation possible.
Common PDP AuthZ APIs	`POST /api/authz/v1/decisions` is the single contract for every out-of-process caller; the in-process `authorize()` is the same core.
HA OpenFGA + PDP-agnostic API	OpenFGA sits behind one pooled adapter with a warm store-id, decision cache, and circuit breaker; callers see `{decision, reason}`, never `can_use`/tuples.

Standalone, no resources touched, slow migration is achieved by shadow mode (§5): the service ships and runs observe-only alongside the existing checks, which stay authoritative until each caller is flipped, one at a time, on measured decision parity.

1. Critique of the problem statement

1.1 What it gets right

Inventory is excellent. The module table (§3.1), endpoint table (§3.1), and DA/RAG anti-pattern tables are accurate and rare in a problem doc.
Core diagnosis is correct. Scattered policy + duplicate PDP hops + leaky abstraction + weak enforcement is the real disease.
Phasing instinct is right (immediate cleanup → hygiene → facade → runtime → RAG).
Honest non-goals. Not replacing OpenFGA; not ripping DA checks in v1.

1.2 Gaps to fix (these reshape the design)

It understates the duplication. This is not "different patterns" — it is three full reimplementations of the same OpenFGA transport + decision logic (openfga.ts, DA openfga_authz.py, RAG rbac.py), plus two duplicate agent-use algorithms inside the BFF itself (requireAgentUsePermission vs evaluateAgentAccess), plus three error envelopes. A library facade (Option 1) cannot fix the Python copies — only a service collapses all three. The doc admits Option 1 "does not alone fix DA/RAG" but never resolves it.
"Facade vs Runtime API" is a false fork. Option 1 (in-process) and Option 2 (HTTP) are the same core exposed two ways, not alternatives to mix. Treating them as separate phases invites two codebases drifting apart again — exactly the disease.
The standalone / "don't touch resources" requirement is unaddressed. Every migration path in the doc rewrites existing call sites. There is no shadow / dual-run / decision-parity mechanism. That mechanism is the only way to satisfy "build it standalone and migrate slowly" safely (§5). Biggest omission.
Threat model is deferred to "open questions." For a security-conscious central PDP, the answers must be in the design: token verification (DA currently base64-decodes the JWT and trusts upstream), subject-binding, OBO impersonation via real tuples (the doc's sketch trusts a context.delegated_subject body field — a spoofing hole), fail-closed + audited break-glass, decision-token replay. §4 answers all of these.
#1755 is mis-scoped. Issue #1755 is a narrow tracking issue — skills RBAC UI parity + an optional useShareableTeams hook, explicitly "no further PR required." It is not the centralization mandate. The real mandate is Kevin's "RAG and agents must not diverge." Don't anchor the PDP architecture to #1755; it's a small UI-DRY cleanup that ships independently.
Workflow delegation hides a least-privilege regression. PR #1751's "pre-grant agent tuples on save" (the modal) writes persistent team#can_use agent tuples — the team can then use that agent outside the workflow forever. Runtime-scoped delegation (grant only for the duration of the run) is the least-privilege answer. The doc lists this as an open question; it should be a decision (§6).
Performance/HA is hand-waved. The DA and RAG OpenFGA clients re-resolve the store id and open a new HTTP client on nearly every call. A central PDP needs a warm store-id, pooled connections, a short-TTL decision cache, a batch endpoint (list-filtering does N checks today), and a circuit breaker. §3.5.
RAG's coarse-role axis is missing from the analysis. rbac.py mixes a READONLY/INGESTONLY/ADMIN hierarchy with OpenFGA. RAG cannot become a thin PEP unless the core subsumes coarse roles or they are explicitly demoted to a cheap local pre-filter (§7).
Contract versioning is left as a question. A "stable external contract" must be versioned from line one (/api/authz/v1). Because the new API is additive, there is no breaking change to existing clients — answering open question #7 directly.

2. Design principles

One decision, one place. Exactly one module computes "may subject S do action A on resource R." Everything else is transport.
The PDP is an implementation detail. Callers send {subject, resource, action, context} and receive {decision, reason}. OpenFGA relation names and tuples never cross the boundary (except the admin /explain tier).
Never trust the caller's identity claims. The service validates every token itself (JWKS) and binds the answer to who is allowed to ask.
Fail closed, observably. PDP error ⇒ DENY + retriable + audit. Break-glass is explicit, time-boxed, alarmed.
Least privilege over convenience. Delegation is runtime-scoped, not a persistent grant, unless an admin deliberately makes it persistent.
Additive first. The service ships touching nothing. Enforcement moves caller-by-caller on measured parity.

3. Target architecture

3.1 The decision core — `ui/src/lib/authz/`

The single reusable module. Pure, transport-free, PDP-agnostic.

ui/src/lib/authz/
  index.ts            # authorize(), authorizeMany(), authorizeOrThrow(), filterAccessible()
  contract.ts         # Subject, Resource, Action, Decision, ReasonCode  (the public vocabulary)
  reasons.ts          # stable reason codes + retriable mapping + user action hints
  compose.ts          # domain composition (workflow visibility, channel scope) layered over PDP
  engine.ts           # PolicyEngine interface
  engines/
    openfga.ts        # the ONLY OpenFGA adapter (wraps today's lib/rbac/openfga.ts transport)
  domains/
    workflow.ts       # workflowDelegatesAgentUse, run visibility (product policy over PDP)
    slack-channel.ts
    webex-space.ts
  cache.ts            # short-TTL decision cache (engine-level)
  audit.ts            # one decision → one audit event (owns the write)

Collapses the two BFF agent-use algorithms. requireAgentUsePermission and evaluateAgentAccess both become thin callers of authorize({subject, resource:{type:"agent"}, action:"use"}). One direct+team-union implementation, one reason taxonomy.
compose.ts is where product policy lives (workflow visibility, derive-team-from-channel) so it sits above the PDP and is reused identically by every transport. This is the home the DA Mongo reads should never have left.
The action→relation map already exists in resource-authz.ts (use → can_use); it moves into engines/openfga.ts as the adapter seam. The action vocabulary is already PDP-agnostic; only the relation strings are FGA-specific.

3.2 Transport A — in-process (BFF routes)

await authorizeOrThrow(session, { type: "agent", id, action: "use" });
const visible = await filterAccessible(session, agents, { type: "agent", action: "discover", id: a => a.id });

No network hop. Existing requireResourcePermission / requireAgentPermission / requireSkillPermission become 3-line wrappers over authorize() so call sites don't churn. ESLint forbids importing engines/openfga outside lib/authz/**.

3.3 Transport B — the common PDP AuthZ API (HTTP)

The single contract for every out-of-process caller (DA, RAG, bots). Versioned, additive, PDP-agnostic.

POST /api/authz/v1/decisions
Authorization: Bearer <caller-token>          # user OR service-account; VERIFIED by the service
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "subject":  { "type": "user", "id": "<oidc-sub>" },
  "resource": { "type": "agent", "id": "platform-engineer" },
  "action":   "use",
  "context":  { "workflow_run_id": "wr-123" }   // advisory only; never *expands* a grant (§4)
}

Response — evaluation succeeded (HTTP 200 for both ALLOW and DENY):

{ "decision": "ALLOW", "reason": "OK", "retriable": false, "ttl_seconds": 15 }

{ "decision": "DENY",  "reason": "NO_CAPABILITY", "retriable": false }

API design note (answers a muddle in the doc's Option 2 sketch): a DENY is not an HTTP error. The evaluation succeeded; the answer is "no" ⇒ 200 with a body. HTTP status is reserved for meta failures: 401 caller not authenticated, 403 caller may not ask about this subject, 400 malformed, 503 PDP unavailable (retriable:true). PEPs translate DENY→ their own 403. This keeps deny-reasoning out of status codes and makes the contract uniform.

Batch (replaces N round-trips for list filtering):

POST /api/authz/v1/decisions:batch
{ "subject": {...}, "action": "discover", "resource_type": "agent", "ids": ["a","b","c"] }
→ { "results": [ { "id":"a","decision":"ALLOW" }, { "id":"b","decision":"DENY","reason":"NO_CAPABILITY" }, ... ] }

Admin explain tier (the only place FGA detail is exposed):

POST /api/authz/v1/explain          # requires can_audit / admin_ui#view
→ { "decision":"DENY", "reason":"NO_CAPABILITY",
    "debug": { "engine":"openfga", "checked":["user:… can_use agent:…","team:… "], "store":"…" } }

This extends the existing draft rebac-policy-api.md (which already defines the {subject, action, resource} vocabulary and a per-type action catalog) into two tiers: runtime/decision (new, PDP-agnostic) and admin/explain (already drafted, FGA-visible). One vocabulary, exactly as Kevin asked.

3.4 Transport C (optional) — signed decision tokens

For the duplicate-hop problem (workflow step execution), the API can mint a short-lived, audience-bound decision token instead of a bare yes/no:

// header: alg, kid       payload:
{ "iss":"caipe-bff", "aud":"dynamic-agents", "sub":"user:<oidc-sub>",
  "res":"agent:platform-engineer", "act":"use",
  "iat":1710000000, "exp":1710000045, "jti":"…" }   // ≤60s

The PEP verifies signature + aud + exp + res/act match offline — no OpenFGA, no Mongo, no second hop.

I disagree with the doc's deferral of this to "Phase 5, optional, expensive." Constrained as above it is cheap and is the cleanest way to satisfy "no Mongo in DA" + "no duplicate PDP hop" + "PDP-agnostic at the boundary" simultaneously:

No revocation machinery needed at ≤60s TTL — document the TTL as the bound on staleness.
Symmetric signing (shared secret in the trust boundary) is acceptable to start; move to JWKS/asymmetric when bots/3rd parties consume it.
It is additive — the workflow engine attaches the token; a PEP that doesn't understand it falls back to a /decisions call.

Keep it optional, but design for it now (P5), don't treat it as exotic.

3.5 PDP adapter, HA OpenFGA, caching

Concern	Today (3× duplicated)	Central service
Store id	Re-resolved via `GET /stores` per call (DA, RAG)	Resolved once at boot, cached, refreshed on miss
HTTP client	New `httpx`/fetch per call	One pooled client, keep-alive
HA	Single OpenFGA assumed	OpenFGA replicated (stateless vs its datastore) behind a Service; adapter retries idempotent `check` across replicas
Hot path	Every check hits OpenFGA	Short-TTL decision cache (≤15s) keyed `(subject,resource,action)`, per-replica bounded LRU; write/manage/delete bypass cache or ≤2s
List filtering	N sequential checks	`decisions:batch` → `BatchCheck`/parallel with bounded concurrency
Outage	Each PEP improvises	One circuit breaker; open ⇒ fail closed (`AUTHZ_UNAVAILABLE`, retriable)
Consistency	n/a	Use OpenFGA `consistency: HIGHER_CONSISTENCY` for sensitive actions; cache TTL bounds staleness for the rest

3.6 PDP-agnostic contract (the stable surface)

type ReasonCode =
  | "OK"                 // ALLOW
  | "NO_CAPABILITY"      // DENY — no relationship      → action: contact_admin
  | "NOT_AUTHENTICATED"  // missing/invalid caller auth → action: sign_in
  | "AUTHZ_UNAVAILABLE"  // PDP timeout/error           → action: retry   (retriable)
  | "INVALID_REQUEST";   // bad id / malformed          → action: fix_request

interface Decision { decision: "ALLOW" | "DENY"; reason: ReasonCode; retriable: boolean; ttl_seconds?: number; token?: string; }

Envelope migration (one shared error-responses builder, used by all surfaces):

Current (leaky, in 3 places)	Public v1	Admin/explain only
`code: "agent#use"`	`reason: "NO_CAPABILITY"`	`debug.relation: "can_use"`
`reason: "pdp_denied"`	`reason: "NO_CAPABILITY"`
`reason: "pdp_unavailable"`	`reason: "AUTHZ_UNAVAILABLE"`
`pdp: "openfga"` in body	omitted	audit log only
tuple strings in messages	omitted	`/explain` only

4. Security model (threats → controls)

The service is a trust boundary. It assumes callers are hostile-capable and verifies everything.

#	Threat	Control
1	Forged subject — caller asks "can `admin-user` do X" and acts on it	Subject-binding. A user token may only evaluate `subject == token.sub`. Cross-subject queries require `can_audit` on the type (admin/explain tier). Default rejects mismatched subject with `403`.
2	Bot impersonation / OBO — bot evaluates for a user	Require both the bot's verified client-credentials token and a verified user assertion (OBO token or signed envelope). Service checks a real tuple `service_account:<id> can_impersonate user:` (or per-user). Never trust a bare `delegated_subject` body field* — that was a hole in the doc's sketch.
3	Caller-decoded / forgeable identity — DA base64-decodes the JWT payload and trusts upstream; epic [#1730] (P1): privileged paths trust unsigned `X-User-Context`, forgeable if DA is reached directly	Service always validates signature, `exp`, `aud`, `iss` via cached JWKS. Body/header-supplied identity is treated only as the target subject, then authorized per #1/#2. No upstream hop or unsigned header is trusted. This is the canonical fix for [#1730].
4	PDP outage → silent allow	Fail closed: `DENY` + `AUTHZ_UNAVAILABLE` + `retriable` + `503` + audit. Break-glass via explicit env flag (mirrors `CAIPE_UNSAFE_RBAC_BYPASS` but centralized, time-boxed, alarmed, audited per request).
5	Decision-token theft / replay (Transport C)	`aud` bound to one downstream, `res`+`act` bound, `exp ≤ 60s`, `jti`, signed. PEP verifies offline; stolen token is useless elsewhere and expires fast.
6	Cache stale-allow	TTL ≤15s read / ≤2s for write-class actions; per-replica; bounded LRU; revocation tolerated within TTL window (documented). Sensitive mutations may set `no-cache`.
7	Confused deputy via `context`	`context` is advisory only. It may narrow (scope) but must never expand a decision beyond the subject's own relationships — except through server-evaluated delegation (the workflow run-authorizer in §6), which is computed inside the core, not asserted by the caller.
8	Enumeration / info leak	DENY reasons are coarse (`NO_CAPABILITY`); no tuple/relation strings outside `/explain`; rate-limit per caller; every decision audited with correlation id.
9	Privilege via the API itself	The decision API is read/evaluate only in v1. No tuple writes. Reconcile/ownership writes stay in their current modules — so standing up the service grants no new mutation surface.

5. Standalone build + shadow migration (touch nothing, migrate slowly)

This is the mechanism the problem statement is missing and the explicit requirement.

5.1 Shadow mode

Each existing PEP gets a thin consult wrapper behind a per-surface flag:

AUTHZ_CENTRAL_MODE = off | shadow | enforce      # per surface: da_agent_use, da_workflow, rag_kb, slack, …

off — legacy only (today).
shadow — call the central API best-effort, time-boxed; compare to the legacy decision; emit an authz_parity metric/audit {surface, legacy, central, agree}. Legacy stays authoritative. Zero user-visible change. This is "standalone without touching resources."
enforce — central is authoritative; legacy code deleted.

  request ─▶ legacy check ──▶ (authoritative) ──▶ response
                │
                └─(shadow)─▶ central /decisions ─▶ parity log  ✗ cannot change outcome

Flip a surface to enforce only after ~100% parity over N days on a dashboard. Roll back instantly by setting the flag to shadow.

5.2 Phases (standalone-first)

Phase	Scope	Touches existing behavior?	Exit gate
P0 Core extraction	Build `lib/authz` core; refactor the 2 BFF agent-use algos + `resource-authz` to call it	No (pure refactor, identical outputs)	Existing tests green; golden-decision parity
P1 The standalone service	`POST /api/authz/v1/{decisions,decisions:batch,explain}` over the core	No (nobody calls it yet)	Contract tests + parity vs in-process core. Ships alone, touches nothing.
P2 Shadow	DA, RAG, bots call central in `shadow`	No (observe-only)	Parity dashboard ~100% per surface
P3 Workflow enforce	Flip `da_workflow`; delete `workflow_execution_authz.py` + `workflow_config_id` Mongo bypass; delegation via central run-authorizer (§6)	Yes (one surface)	DA reads no workflow/team Mongo
P4 Agent-use + RAG enforce	Flip `da_agent_use`, `rag_*`; DA drops its OpenFGA client + Mongo audit writes; `rbac.py` → thin PEP	Yes (per surface)	No OpenFGA client / policy Mongo in DA or RAG
P5 (optional) Decision tokens	Workflow engine attaches tokens; PEP verifies offline	Yes	Duplicate hop ([#1731]) gone; ADR for [#1458]

Cross-cutting: the v1 envelope (§3.6) is native on the new API from P1. Legacy routes adopt the shared error-responses builder opportunistically — no breaking change because the new API is additive and versioned (answers open Q#7).

6. Workflow delegation done right (PR #1751)

Decision: runtime-scoped delegation, not persistent pre-grants.

Operation	Owner	Mechanism
Create/update/list/cancel workflow + runs	BFF	existing `workflow-configs` / `workflow-runs` routes
"Can this user run this workflow?"	core `domains/workflow.ts`	`workflowDelegatesAgentUse` = agent ∈ steps AND run visibility — wired at `POST /api/workflow-runs`
Step execution agent-use	central run-authorizer	At run start the BFF computes the delegated set once; step calls carry a run-scoped decision (or token, P5). DA does not read `workflow_configs`.
DA workflow tools	DA → BFF `WorkflowApiClient`	already correct — keep

Flag the regression: PR #1751's modal that pre-grants team#can_use agent tuples on save is an over-grant — it lets the team use the agent outside the workflow, permanently. Prefer runtime delegation (above). If product genuinely wants standing access, make it an explicit, separate, admin-visible grant, not a side effect of saving a workflow. workflowDelegatesAgentUse already exists and is unused — wire it instead of writing tuples.

7. RAG & DA convergence

RAG becomes a thin PEP over HTTP. A shared Python library would be a fourth reimplementation — reject it. RAG calls POST /api/authz/v1/decisions (and :batch for inject_kb_filter's datasource list). The service owns the channel→team Mongo lookup (it already has the data); RAG stops reading channel_team_mappings/teams.
Coarse roles (READONLY/INGESTONLY/ADMIN) are demoted to a local pre-filter: client-credentials/automation principals short-circuit before calling central (cheap, preserves automation); all human/per-resource decisions go to central. Don't let coarse roles re-enter the resource decision.
DA drops openfga_authz.py's OpenFGA client, its per-call store-id discovery, its Mongo audit writes, and workflow_execution_authz.py entirely. require_agent_use_permission → require_authorization(resource, action) calling central (or verifying a decision token in P5).

8. CI enforcement (aim the existing guards at the new boundary)

Keep the doc's Option 4 guards, retargeted:

Guard	Blocks
ESLint `no-restricted-imports`	importing `engines/openfga` (or `lib/rbac/openfga`) outside `lib/authz/**`
`validate-authz-boundaries.py` (new)	`workflow_configs`/`teams`/OpenFGA-client imports in `dynamic_agents/**` and RAG once their surface is `enforce`
extend `validate-fga-create-paths.py`	new BFF routes must reach OpenFGA only via the core
`fga-enforcement-manifest.ts`	add `task`/workflow + runtime `/api/authz/v1/*` surfaces
Parity test (new)	central decision == legacy for a golden fixture set (gates each `shadow→enforce` flip)

9. Answers to the problem statement's open questions

DA execution gate — Keep OpenFGA in DA only during shadow (P2). At enforce (P4), DA holds no PDP client; it calls central or verifies a decision token. Dual-gate ([#1731]) is resolved empirically by parity, not debate.
Workflow delegation — Runtime-scoped via the central run-authorizer (§6). Persistent pre-grants only as an explicit, separate admin action.
Generic vs domain HTTP APIs — One generic POST /api/authz/v1/decisions + :batch. Domain endpoints (authorize-run) become thin wrappers that call the core with a context; they are conveniences, not parallel logic.
RAG — HTTP client to the central API. No shared Python policy library (it would be reimplementation #4).
Service-account delegation — Verified OBO: bot token + user assertion + real can_impersonate tuple. Never a trusted body field (§4 #2).
Claim revocation — Not required at ≤60s TTL; TTL is the documented staleness bound (§3.4).
Breaking API changes — None. New API is /api/authz/v1 and additive; legacy clients migrate envelopes opportunistically. No /v2 flag day.
Workflow task in FGA — Mongo visibility stays a product policy layer in domains/workflow.ts above FGA for now; revisit folding it fully into FGA after P4, as a separate decision.

10. Recommendation

Option mix: Option 1 (core) ≡ Option 2 (HTTP) as one thing + Option 5 (vocabulary) adopted into contract.ts + Option 4 (enforcement) aimed at the new boundary + `Option 3 (decision tokens) promoted from "someday" to a real P5, constrained.

Split into three specs (the doc asks whether to split — yes):

Spec A — Core + envelope + enforcement (P0–P1, + §3.6, + §8). Ships the standalone service. No behavior change.
Spec B — Runtime convergence (P2–P4 shadow→enforce for DA/RAG/bots, + §6 workflow delegation).
Spec C — Decision tokens (P5, optional), gated on [#1458] ADR.

Ordered task list (Spec A first — the standalone service you asked for):

lib/authz/contract.ts + reasons.ts — PDP-agnostic types & reason codes.
engines/openfga.ts — wrap today's transport; warm store-id; pooled client; cache hook.
index.ts authorize/authorizeMany/authorizeOrThrow/filterAccessible; fold the two agent-use algos into it.
Refactor requireResourcePermission/requireAgentUsePermission/evaluateAgentAccess to call the core (no behavior change; golden parity test).
domains/workflow.ts — move visibility/workflowDelegatesAgentUse here.
POST /api/authz/v1/{decisions,decisions:batch,explain} over the core; v1 envelope; caller-token verification + subject-binding (§4 #1–#3).
Shared error-responses v1 builder; switch BFF authz throws to it.
ESLint import boundary + parity test harness.
Stop. Ship. The service is live, used by no one, touching nothing → then begin Spec B shadow.

10.1 Alignment with the real epic [#1742] (and one correction)

I verified against the epic itself — it aligns with this architecture better than the problem statement's own §8 table does:

The runtime HTTP API is already a prerequisite, not a late phase. #1742 states: "#1455 — runtime BFF ReBAC endpoints — must land before the Slack BFF moves (#1737, #1739)." That is exactly Transport B / Spec A. → Correction: the "facade (Phase 2) then runtime API (Phase 3)" sequencing is the problem statement's §8, not the epic. The epic supports shipping the service first.
This service is the canonical fix for the epic's top P1. #1730 (DA trusts unsigned, forgeable X-User-Context) is resolved by §4 #1–#3 — mandatory token verification + subject-binding at the central boundary. The problem statement under-weighted #1730; it should be the headline security driver.
Slack P1s shrink as a side effect. Once bots get decisions + identity linking from the BFF (#1737/#1739, gated on #1455), the bot sheds Keycloak-Admin/Mongo blast radius (#1741).

Epic sub-issue → spec map:

Spec	Closes / enables
A Core + HTTP API + envelope	#1455 (prereq), enables #1730; sets up #1733 (service owns audit), #1736 (service owns cached channel→team)
B Convergence (shadow→enforce)	#1730, #1731, #1733 (DA); #1734/#1735/#1736 (RAG); #1737/#1739/#1741 (Slack)
C Decision tokens (optional)	#1731 capstone; gated on #1458 dual-gate ADR

Remaining contradictions to reconcile:

#1742 Phase 0 "remove DA workflow Mongo" is right, but the replacement (runtime delegation) must land in domains/workflow.ts, not as new DA-side logic. Sequence at P3.
PR #1751's modal pre-grant contradicts the least-privilege delegation in §6 — reconcile before it becomes load-bearing.
#1755 is not in scope of this architecture (narrow skills-UI DRY); keep it independent so it isn't blocked on the PDP work.

0. TL;DR — the decision​

1. Critique of the problem statement​

1.1 What it gets right​

1.2 Gaps to fix (these reshape the design)​

2. Design principles​

3. Target architecture​

3.1 The decision core — ui/src/lib/authz/​

3.2 Transport A — in-process (BFF routes)​

3.3 Transport B — the common PDP AuthZ API (HTTP)​

3.4 Transport C (optional) — signed decision tokens​

3.5 PDP adapter, HA OpenFGA, caching​

3.6 PDP-agnostic contract (the stable surface)​

4. Security model (threats → controls)​

5. Standalone build + shadow migration (touch nothing, migrate slowly)​

5.1 Shadow mode​

5.2 Phases (standalone-first)​

6. Workflow delegation done right (PR #1751)​

7. RAG & DA convergence​

8. CI enforcement (aim the existing guards at the new boundary)​

9. Answers to the problem statement's open questions​

10. Recommendation​

10.1 Alignment with the real epic [#1742] (and one correction)​