Version: main 🚧

Plan: Remove the Slack bot's direct Keycloak Admin credentials

Status: Ready to implement (fresh session). Author of plan: drafted at the end of the #1781 work session. Tracking: follow-up to #1781 (PR #1788). No GitHub issue yet — create one (suggested title: "Remove KEYCLOAK_SLACK_BOT_ADMIN_ — route all Slack bot Keycloak access through the BFF"*) and reference it in the PR.

0. How to start (READ FIRST)

Base all changes off the branch feat/1781-bff-provision-shell-user — NOT main. That branch (PR #1788) introduced the canonical provisionShellUser lib function, the POST /api/admin/users/provision-shell BFF endpoint, the bff_client-based Slack-bot call pattern, and the admin_surface:user_provisioning OpenFGA grant. This plan extends that exact pattern to the bot's remaining Keycloak Admin operations. If #1788 has merged to main by the time you start, branch off main instead and confirm those pieces are present.

# If #1788 is still open:
git fetch origin
git worktree add ../caipe-remove-slackbot-kc-admin -b feat/slack-bot-remove-direct-keycloak-admin origin/feat/1781-bff-provision-shell-user

# If #1788 already merged:
git worktree add ../caipe-remove-slackbot-kc-admin -b feat/slack-bot-remove-direct-keycloak-admin origin/main

Work in the new worktree. Reuse the #1781 implementation as the template for everything below — it is the reference for endpoint shape, auth gating, the Python bff_client call, error mapping, OpenFGA seeding, and test style.

Environment notes (from the #1781 session):

Python venv lives at the repo root: use /Users/kkantesa/ai-platform-engineering/.venv/bin/{python,pytest,ruff}. In a fresh worktree run pytest with PYTHONPATH=<worktree-root> so it loads the worktree copy.
The UI worktree has no node_modules. Symlink the main repo's to run jest/tsc/eslint: ln -s /Users/kkantesa/ai-platform-engineering/ui/node_modules <worktree>/ui/node_modules (verify package.json is identical first; remove the symlink before committing).
There are 9 pre-existing Slack-bot test failures/errors from a missing slack_sdk module in the venv (test_slack_route_no_silent_failure.py, test_error_recovery.py). These are unrelated — confirm they also fail on main and ignore them.

1. Goal & motivation

Today the Slack bot reaches Keycloak two different ways:

caipe-slack-bot service-account token (via ai_platform_engineering/integrations/slack_bot/utils/bff_client.py) → talks to the BFF (Next.js UI). Authentication is the SA JWT; the BFF graphs it as service_account:<sub> and authorizes it with OpenFGA grants. This is the correct, first-party path.
KEYCLOAK_SLACK_BOT_ADMIN_* credentials (client caipe-platform, via keycloak_admin.py → _get_admin_token / KeycloakAdminConfig) → talks to the Keycloak Admin REST API directly. This is the layering smell #1781 called out: a bot holding realm-management credentials.

#1781 moved user creation from path (2) to path (1). This plan moves the remaining Keycloak Admin operations (lookups + attribute read/write) onto path (1) as well, and then deletes the KEYCLOAK_SLACK_BOT_ADMIN_* credentials from the Slack bot entirely — code, env, chart, secrets, and docs.

Net effect: the Slack bot holds exactly one Keycloak credential (its SA client-credentials token), and every capability it has is an explicit, auditable OpenFGA grant seeded in init-token-exchange.sh. The token does service-to-service auth; the grants are its RBAC.

Out of scope (do NOT touch): the Webex bot. See §8.

2. Exact inventory of the Slack bot's direct-Keycloak-Admin surface

keycloak_admin.py exports 8 functions that use the direct-Admin path (_get_admin_token + KeycloakAdminConfig). Their real usage:

Function	Live Slack-bot caller(s)	Disposition
`get_user_by_attribute(attr, value)`	`identity_linker.py` — resolve `slack_user_id`; read `slack_preauth_prompted` / `slack_preauth_prompted_at`	Migrate (read-by-attribute)
`get_user_by_email(email)`	`identity_linker.py:177` (`auto_bootstrap_slack_user`)	Migrate (read-by-email)
`get_user_attribute(user_id, attr)`	`channel_team_mapper.py:238` — read `caipe_default_team_id`	Migrate (read one attribute by id)
`set_user_attribute(user_id, attr, value)`	`identity_linker.py` — write `slack_user_id`, `slack_preauth_prompted_at`	Migrate (write/merge one attribute by id)
`create_user_from_slack(...)`	`identity_linker.py:215`	Already migrated in #1781 (calls BFF)
`remove_user_attribute(...)`	none	Dead code — delete
`fetch_user_realm_role_names(...)`	none	Dead code — delete
`get_user_by_id(user_id)`	none in Slack bot; Webex bot only (`webex_bot/utils/space_team_resolver.py:242`)	Leave (Webex out of scope; see §8)

So the live Slack surface to migrate is 4 functions → 3 logical operations:

read user by attribute (exact)
read user by email (exact)
read a single attribute off a known user id
write/merge a single attribute onto a known user id

The reads (by-attribute, by-email, single-attribute-by-id) all return "a user record (id + attributes + enabled)", so they collapse into one resolve endpoint. The write is one attribute-merge endpoint.

Verify the inventory before coding

# Confirm no NEW callers appeared since this plan was written:
for fn in get_user_by_attribute get_user_by_email get_user_attribute set_user_attribute \
          remove_user_attribute fetch_user_realm_role_names get_user_by_id; do
  echo "=== $fn ==="
  grep -rn "\b$fn\b" ai_platform_engineering/integrations/slack_bot --include="*.py" | grep -v "/tests/" | grep -v "def $fn"
done

If remove_user_attribute / fetch_user_realm_role_names gained a caller, or get_user_by_id gained a Slack caller, adjust scope accordingly.

3. The authorization constraint that shapes the design (IMPORTANT)

You cannot simply point the bot at existing user endpoints. Two reasons:

No lookup-by-attribute or lookup-by-email endpoint exists anywhere under ui/src/app/api/. They must be built.
requireRbacPermission hardcodes user:${subject} (see ui/src/lib/api-middleware.ts ~line 827) — it does not call subjectFromSession, so a service-account token is graphed as user:<sub> and can never match a service_account: OpenFGA grant. The same is true of requireUserProfileRead in ui/src/lib/rbac/require-openfga.ts (uses user:${caller}). The existing GET/PUT /api/admin/users/[id] routes use these gates, so the bot's SA token would 403 there.

Only requireResourcePermission(session, {type, id, action}) (ui/src/lib/rbac/resource-authz.ts) uses subjectFromSession, which graphs isServiceAccount callers as service_account:<sub>. This is the gate #1781's provision-shell endpoint uses, and the one you must use here.

Therefore: new endpoints, gated with requireResourcePermission on an admin_surface:* object, authorized by a seeded SA grant. This mirrors #1781 exactly.

4. Design — two new BFF endpoints

Use a single admin surface object for the bot's user-directory access. Suggested id: admin_surface:user_directory (distinct from #1781's admin_surface:user_provisioning, so read/lookup access is grantable separately from create access — least privilege). The admin_surface OpenFGA type already lists service_account as a valid reader and writer (confirmed in deploy/openfga/model.fga and charts/.../openfga/authorization-model.json), so no model change is required — these are just new object instances.

Naming decision to confirm with a maintainer: one surface (user_directory) for both read and write, vs. reusing user_provisioning. Recommendation: a dedicated user_directory surface, reader for the lookups and writer for the attribute merge. Keep it one object with two relations rather than two objects.

4a. `GET /api/admin/users/resolve` — exact user lookup

File: ui/src/app/api/admin/users/resolve/route.ts

Query contract (pick ONE locator):

?attribute=<name>&value=<v> → exact attribute match (reuses lib findRealmUserIdByAttribute, then getRealmUserById for the full record).
?email=<addr> → exact email match (reuses lib findUserIdByEmail + getRealmUserById).
?id=<sub> → fetch by id (reuses lib getRealmUserById).

SECURITY — whitelist the attribute name. Do not allow arbitrary attribute queries. Restrict attribute to an allowlist: {"slack_user_id", "slack_preauth_prompted", "slack_preauth_prompted_at", "caipe_default_team_id"}. Reject anything else with 400. (A generic "resolve any user by any attribute" surface for a bot SA is more powerful than provision-shell and should be explicitly bounded.)

Response: { success, data: { sub, enabled, attributes } | null }. Return data: null (200) for "no match", NOT 404 — the Python callers treat "not found" as a normal branch, and 404 would force awkward error handling. Include enabled (the bot drops disabled users) and attributes (the bot reads specific attribute values off the record).

Auth:

const { session } = await getAuthFromBearerOrSession(request);
await requireResourcePermission(
  session,
  { type: "admin_surface", id: "user_directory", action: "read" },
  { bypassForOrgAdmin: true }
);

4b. `PATCH /api/admin/users/[id]/attributes` — merge attributes

File: ui/src/app/api/admin/users/[id]/attributes/route.ts

Body: { attributes: Record<string, string[]> }. Merge semantics (reuse the existing lib mergeUserAttributes(userId, attrs) — it already does the Keycloak-26 user-profile round-trip that the Python set_user_attribute replicates, so this is the natural server-side home for that logic).

SECURITY — whitelist writable attribute keys. Restrict to {"slack_user_id", "slack_preauth_prompted_at"} (the only ones the bot writes). Reject other keys with 400 so the SA can't set arbitrary identity attributes. Also reject the server-owned created_by / created_at (consistent with provision-shell).

Response: { success, data: { ok: true } }.

Auth: same as above but action: "write".

4c. Tests for both endpoints

Mirror ui/src/app/api/admin/users/provision-shell/__tests__/provision-shell-route.test.ts: mock next-auth, auth-config, config, jwt-validation (return {sub, email, name, isServiceAccount:true}), openfga, audit, the keycloak-admin lib, and mongodb. Cover: SA authorized via the grant; org-admin bypass; denied without grant (403); the attribute whitelist (400 on disallowed name/key); "no match" → data:null/200 on resolve.

5. Python migration (`ai_platform_engineering/integrations/slack_bot/utils/keycloak_admin.py`)

Follow the exact pattern create_user_from_slack now uses (post-#1781): build the URL from resolve_bff_base_url(), headers from bff_headers(bearer_token=service_account_token(), json_body=...), call via httpx.AsyncClient, map non-2xx to typed errors, parse the {success, data} envelope.

Rewrite these four functions to call the new endpoints (keep their signatures identical so identity_linker.py and channel_team_mapper.py are untouched):

get_user_by_attribute(attr, value) → GET /api/admin/users/resolve?attribute=&value=, return data (the user dict) or None.
get_user_by_email(email) → GET /api/admin/users/resolve?email=, return data or None.
get_user_attribute(user_id, attr) → GET /api/admin/users/resolve?id=, then pull attributes[attr][0] from data; return None if absent.
set_user_attribute(user_id, attr, value) → PATCH /api/admin/users/{id}/attributes with {attributes: {attr: [value]}}.

Error handling: these are not JIT paths, so they don't use JitError. Match the current behavior: the existing functions call resp.raise_for_status() and let httpx.HTTPStatusError propagate. Decide per call site whether callers want exceptions or graceful None:

channel_team_mapper.get_effective_team and identity_linker lookups already treat None as "not found / fall through". For transport/HTTP errors, preserve today's semantics (they currently bubble up from raise_for_status). Keep it simple: raise on unexpected status, return None on a clean "no match" (data: null).

Remove:

_get_admin_token, KeycloakAdminConfig, _default_config, _user_profile_roundtrip, _USER_PROFILE_ROUNDTRIP_FIELDS — once nothing in the module uses the direct-Admin path anymore. (Double-check no remaining function references them.)
remove_user_attribute, fetch_user_realm_role_names — dead code.
The config: KeycloakAdminConfig | None = None parameter on the migrated functions (no longer meaningful). create_user_from_slack already accepts but ignores config for signature-compat; you may drop the param there too since this is an all-at-once change with no backwards-compat requirement (confirmed by the user for #1781). Update all call sites accordingly.
The module docstring's KEYCLOAK_SLACK_BOT_ADMIN_* documentation block, and the KeycloakAdminConfig env-var explanation. Replace with a note that all Keycloak access now flows through the BFF via bff_client.

NOTE: after this migration, keycloak_admin.py may no longer warrant its name (it's now a thin BFF client for user ops). Consider renaming to bff_user_client.py or folding into an existing client — but that's optional polish; do the functional migration first and rename only if cheap.

6. OpenFGA grant

Add the directory grants to SA_GRANTS in one file (the deploy path is a symlink to the chart script — confirmed): charts/ai-platform-engineering/charts/keycloak/scripts/init-token-exchange.sh (deploy/keycloak/init-token-exchange.sh → symlink to it).

The loop splits SA_GRANTS on newlines. After #1781 it reads:

SA_GRANTS="reader system_config:platform_settings
writer admin_surface:user_provisioning"

Add:

SA_GRANTS="reader system_config:platform_settings
writer admin_surface:user_provisioning
reader admin_surface:user_directory
writer admin_surface:user_directory"

Update the comment block above SA_GRANTS to document the two new grants (read = lookups, write = attribute merge). No OpenFGA model change needed.

Verify the parse:

SA_GRANTS="reader system_config:platform_settings
writer admin_surface:user_provisioning
reader admin_surface:user_directory
writer admin_surface:user_directory"
echo "$SA_GRANTS" | while IFS= read -r g; do [ -z "$g" ] && continue; echo "rel=[${g%% *}] obj=[${g##* }]"; done

7. Remove `KEYCLOAK_SLACK_BOT_ADMIN_*` everywhere (the payoff)

Only after the code no longer reads these vars. Full reference list (captured 2026-06-09 — re-grep to confirm before editing):

grep -rln "KEYCLOAK_SLACK_BOT_ADMIN" --include="*.py" --include="*.ts" \
  --include="*.yaml" --include="*.yml" --include="*.md" --include="*.sh" \
  --include="*.example" . | grep -v node_modules

Code / config to update:

ai_platform_engineering/integrations/slack_bot/utils/keycloak_admin.py — remove (see §5).
setup-caipe.sh — drop the var prompts/exports.
docker-compose.dev.yaml — remove the two env entries from the slack-bot service.
charts/ai-platform-engineering/values.yaml — remove the keys.
charts/ai-platform-engineering/charts/slack-bot/values.yaml — remove.
charts/ai-platform-engineering/charts/slack-bot/templates/deployment.yaml — remove the env wiring.

Tests:

ai_platform_engineering/integrations/slack_bot/tests/test_keycloak_admin_config.py — this entire file tests KeycloakAdminConfig env precedence. Once the config class is gone, delete this test file (its subject no longer exists).
ai_platform_engineering/integrations/slack_bot/tests/test_keycloak_admin_jit.py — #1781 already rewrote this to test the BFF call. Update the remaining set_user_attribute test (currently still uses the direct-Admin KeycloakAdminConfig/token mock) to instead assert the PATCH .../attributes BFF call. Add tests for the migrated get_user_by_* / get_user_attribute functions (assert URL, headers, query params, envelope parsing, None on data:null).

Docs (update prose; these are not load-bearing for code):

docs/docs/security/rbac/{file-map,workflows,architecture}.md — update any description of the Slack bot calling Keycloak Admin directly; point to the BFF endpoints + OpenFGA grants instead.
docs/docs/specs/098-enterprise-rbac-slack-ui/{operator-guide,quickstart}.md and docs/docs/specs/103-slack-jit-user-creation/* — these are historical spec docs. Add a short forward-reference note ("superseded by <this spec / PR>; the bot no longer uses KEYCLOAK_SLACK_BOT_ADMIN_*") rather than rewriting history.
docs/releases/2026-05-26-release-0-5-0.md and scripts/migrations/0.5.0/RUN.md — historical; leave unless a maintainer wants a migration note. Mention the removal in the current release notes / a new migration note instead (a removed env var is an operator-facing change).

Operator migration note: removing an env var that operators may have set is a deployment-facing change. Add a short note to the release/upgrade docs: "KEYCLOAK_SLACK_BOT_ADMIN_CLIENT_ID/SECRET are no longer used by the Slack bot and can be removed from values.yaml/.env; the bot now reaches Keycloak only through the BFF using its caipe-slack-bot service account." Use the release-docs / update-docs skills if appropriate.

8. Webex bot — EXPLICITLY OUT OF SCOPE

Per the user: do not include Webex.

The Webex bot (ai_platform_engineering/integrations/webex_bot/utils/space_team_resolver.py:242) is the only remaining caller of get_user_by_id, via its own webex_bot/utils/keycloak_admin.py (a separate module from the Slack bot's).
This plan touches only the Slack bot's keycloak_admin.py. Leave the Webex module and its credentials untouched.
Guard rail: do not remove KEYCLOAK_SLACK_BOT_ADMIN_* in a way that breaks Webex. Confirm Webex uses its own creds (e.g. KEYCLOAK_WEBEX_BOT_ADMIN_* or a separate config) and is unaffected. If Webex shares any removed var, STOP and flag it — do not strand Webex.
```
grep -rn "KEYCLOAK_.*ADMIN\|KeycloakAdminConfig\|_get_admin_token" \
  ai_platform_engineering/integrations/webex_bot --include="*.py"
```

A parallel "migrate Webex to BFF endpoints" effort can reuse the resolve endpoint built here (it's bot-agnostic — get_user_by_id maps to ?id=). Note that as a future opportunity; do not implement it.

9. Testing & quality gates (run all before PR)

# Python — migrated module + linker + mapper (NOT the dead config test, which is deleted)
PYTHONPATH=<worktree> /Users/kkantesa/ai-platform-engineering/.venv/bin/pytest \
  ai_platform_engineering/integrations/slack_bot/tests/test_keycloak_admin_jit.py \
  ai_platform_engineering/integrations/slack_bot/tests/test_identity_linker_jit.py \
  ai_platform_engineering/integrations/slack_bot/tests/ -q
/Users/kkantesa/ai-platform-engineering/.venv/bin/ruff check ai_platform_engineering/integrations/slack_bot/

# UI (symlink node_modules first)
cd ui
npx jest src/app/api/admin/users           # resolve + [id]/attributes + provision-shell
npx tsc --noEmit -p tsconfig.json
npx eslint src/app/api/admin/users/resolve/route.ts \
           "src/app/api/admin/users/[id]/attributes/route.ts" \
           src/lib/rbac/keycloak-admin.ts

# RBAC matrix validator (resource-permission routes are NOT required in the matrix,
# but run it to confirm nothing regressed)
/Users/kkantesa/ai-platform-engineering/.venv/bin/python scripts/validate-rbac-matrix.py

Expected: all green except the 9 pre-existing slack_sdk failures (§0). Remember to delete the node_modules symlink before committing.

10. Risks & decisions to confirm with a maintainer

Attribute whitelist scope. Recommended: lock both endpoints to the known Slack attribute names (§4a/§4b). A generic query/write surface for a bot SA is a larger attack surface. Confirm the allowlist is acceptable (it must include caipe_default_team_id for the channel-team path).
Surface naming. admin_surface:user_directory (new) vs. reusing admin_surface:user_provisioning. Recommended: new, for least privilege.
resolve "not found" = 200 data:null (not 404). Keeps the Python callers' control flow clean. Confirm reviewers are OK with that convention.
Error semantics on transport failure. The current direct-Admin functions raise_for_status(). Preserve "raise on unexpected, None on clean no-match" so callers behave identically. Watch channel_team_mapper (a failure there should degrade gracefully, not crash team resolution).
Module rename (keycloak_admin.py → BFF client) — optional; skip if not cheap.

11. File-by-file checklist

New:

ui/src/app/api/admin/users/resolve/route.ts
ui/src/app/api/admin/users/resolve/__tests__/resolve-route.test.ts
ui/src/app/api/admin/users/[id]/attributes/route.ts
ui/src/app/api/admin/users/[id]/attributes/__tests__/attributes-route.test.ts

Modified:

ai_platform_engineering/integrations/slack_bot/utils/keycloak_admin.py (migrate 4 fns, delete dead code + config/token plumbing + docstring)
ai_platform_engineering/integrations/slack_bot/tests/test_keycloak_admin_jit.py (update set_user_attribute test → BFF; add lookup tests)
charts/ai-platform-engineering/charts/keycloak/scripts/init-token-exchange.sh (two new SA_GRANTS rows + comment)
setup-caipe.sh, docker-compose.dev.yaml, charts/.../values.yaml (x2), charts/.../slack-bot/templates/deployment.yaml (drop env)
RBAC + release/migration docs (prose updates per §7)

Deleted:

ai_platform_engineering/integrations/slack_bot/tests/test_keycloak_admin_config.py
KEYCLOAK_SLACK_BOT_ADMIN_* references everywhere they're set/consumed

Verify untouched: webex_bot/**, Webex credentials.

12. Commit / PR

Conventional commit, e.g. refactor(slack): route all Slack-bot Keycloak access through the BFF; drop direct admin creds.
DCO: git commit -s only after explicit human sign-off in the session (per CLAUDE.md). Add Assisted-by: Claude:<model>. No Co-Authored-By.
Reference the new tracking issue and note it builds on #1788.
Use the pr-caipe skill to open the PR.

0. How to start (READ FIRST)​

1. Goal & motivation​

2. Exact inventory of the Slack bot's direct-Keycloak-Admin surface​

Verify the inventory before coding​

3. The authorization constraint that shapes the design (IMPORTANT)​

4. Design — two new BFF endpoints​

4a. GET /api/admin/users/resolve — exact user lookup​

4b. PATCH /api/admin/users/[id]/attributes — merge attributes​

4c. Tests for both endpoints​

5. Python migration (ai_platform_engineering/integrations/slack_bot/utils/keycloak_admin.py)​

6. OpenFGA grant​

7. Remove KEYCLOAK_SLACK_BOT_ADMIN_* everywhere (the payoff)​

8. Webex bot — EXPLICITLY OUT OF SCOPE​

9. Testing & quality gates (run all before PR)​

10. Risks & decisions to confirm with a maintainer​

11. File-by-file checklist​

12. Commit / PR​